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In this research note, we introduce a graded BDI agent development framework, g-BDI
for short, that allows to build agents as multi-context systems that reason about three
fundamental and graded mental attitudes (i.e. beliefs, desires and intentions). We propose
a sound and complete logical framework for them and some logical extensions to
accommodate slightly different views on desires.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Consider the following scenario: María, who lives in busy Buenos Aires, wants to relax for a few days in an Argentinian beautiful
destination. She would be rather happy of practicing rafting and very happy going to a mountain place. She would like more to go
climbing than to go trekking. On top of this, she is stressed and would like to get to the destination with a short trip. Taking into
account her preferences and constraints, the task of María’s personal agent is to get, using domain knowledge, an adequate
tourist package satisfying her preferences.
Preferences are the proactive attitude of intentional agents, the motor that make the agent act, building suitable plans
that try to satisfy the most preferred goals, while satisfying a given set of constraints. Constraints are also a key modeling
aspect that account for restrictions or rejections over the possible states the agent can reach.
In BDI agent architectures [14,21,23], desires represent the ideal agent preferences regardless of the current agent per-
ception of the environment and regardless of the cost involved in actually achieving them. We consider important for an
agent to distinguish what is positively desired from what is not rejected. By doing so, positive desires then represent what
the agent would like to be the case while negative desires will correspond to what the agent rejects or does not want to
occur. Furthermore, if the agent needs to represent different levels of preference or rejection, the notions of positive and
negative desires become naturally graded.
To have a powerful and ﬂexible representation of an agent preferences is thus a fundamental issue to be addressed in
any agent model. With this aim, in this work we present a general framework to deﬁne graded BDI agent architectures
(g-BDI agents for short), based on multi-context systems [21]. In particular, we introduce a graded logical framework (i.e.
languages, axioms and inference rules) to represent and reason, not only about the agent positive and negative desires,
but also about other mental attitudes as beliefs and intentions. Namely, in a g-BDI agent, belief degrees represent to what
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preference or rejection respectively and intention degrees represent also a preference level but, in this case, modeling the
cost/beneﬁt trade-off of reaching a goal.
Computational aspects of this agent framework are out of the scope of this research note due to lack of space. First
results on giving operational semantics to g-BDI agents, using process calculus have been presented in [7]. As a case study
of our g-BDI agent framework we have designed and implemented a prototype of a Tourism Recommender agent (T-Agent)
[10] and have obtained encouraging initial experimental results [9]. This paper builds on authors’ previous work [8] where
the logical representation of graded preferences and intentions was expressed in a unique “ﬂat” logical framework. Instead,
here we present a multi-context agent framework where a different context is used for each mental attitude.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section 2, we ﬁrst present the basic ingredients of the g-BDI agent model
with its multi-context speciﬁcation, and in the next sections the different components of the agent model are deﬁned. In
Section 3 we formalize the Desire context to represent the agent’s positive and negative preferences, inspired in the bipolar
representation of preferences in the framework of possibilistic logic proposed in [2,3]. Next, in Section 4 we formalize
the Intention context and in Section 5, we brieﬂy outline the Belief context to represent the agent uncertain beliefs. The
necessary functional contexts for planning and communication, and the bridge rules to transfer formulae between theories
for an illustrative agent model are brieﬂy described in Section 6. Finally, a very short technical appendix with main facts of
Rational Pavelka logic, that is used throughout the paper, has been included.
2. The graded BDI agent model
Several previous works have proposed agent theories and architectures to provide multiagent systems with a strong
formal basis. Among them, one of the most widely recognized is the BDI agent architecture presented by Rao and Georgeff
[23]. We consider that an extension of this architecture to incorporate degrees in the different attitudes would not only make
the model semantics richer, but it would also help the agents in taking better decisions. With that aim we have revisited
the classical BDI agent architecture to represent and reason under uncertain beliefs and graded motivations. In this section
we introduce the basic ingredients of a general model for graded BDI agents (g-BDI). The g-BDI model we consider extends
the multi-context speciﬁcation of agents proposed by Parsons et al. in [21] with the ability to represent graded mental
attitudes.
2.1. Multi-context speciﬁcation
Multi-context systems (MCS) were introduced in [15] to allow different formal (logic) components to be deﬁned sepa-
rately and then interrelated. An MCS speciﬁcation contains three basic components: units or contexts, logics, and bridge
rules, which channel the propagation of formulae among theories. Thus, an agent programmed as an MCS is deﬁned
as a group of interconnected units: 〈{Ci}i∈I ,br〉, where each context Ci ∈ {Ci}i∈I deﬁnes a logic speciﬁed by a tuple
Ci = 〈Li, Ai,i〉 with Li , Ai and i being the language, axioms, and inference rules respectively. br is a set of bridge
rules, that can be understood as rules of inference with premises and conclusions in different contexts. For instance:
C1 : ψ,C2 : ϕ
C3 : θ
means that if formula ψ is deduced in context C1 and formula ϕ is deduced in context C2 then the theory of context C3
is extended with formula θ . When a theory Ti ⊂ Li is associated with each unit, the speciﬁcation of a particular agent is
complete. The deduction mechanism of these systems is based on two kinds of inference rules, internal rules i inside each
unit, and bridge rules br outside. Internal rules allow to draw consequences within a theory, while bridge rules allow to
relate the results within one or several theories with extensions of another theory. Any reasonable implementation of a
multi-context system needs some kind of control strategy to synchronize and co-ordinate both kinds of inferences (i.e. by
internal rules and by bridge rules).
In the running illustrative architecture we have mental contexts to represent beliefs (BC), desires (DC) and intentions (IC).
We also consider two functional contexts, for planning (PC) and communication (CC). The planner context is in charge of
ﬁnding plans to change the current world into another world, where some desire is satisﬁed, and of computing the cost
associated to the plans. The communication context is the agent door to the external world, receiving and sending messages.
In summary, the illustrative g-BDI agent architecture is thus deﬁned as:
Ag =
({BC,DC, IC,PC,CC},br
)
We could certainly program agents with several belief contexts for instance. The architecture is a minimum skeleton
containing the three modalities. The different contexts of the architecture will be described in some detail in the following
sections. In Fig. 1 we present a schema of the architecture used to illustrate the g-BDI model with the mentioned set of
mental contexts (BC, DC and IC) and functional ones (PC and CC) and some bridge rules ((1) to (6)) interrelating them. The
contexts and concrete architecture we present will thus serve as a blueprint to design different kinds of agents.
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2.2. Logical framework: a many-valued modal approach
During the last two decades, the Artiﬁcial Intelligence community has undertaken the problem of knowledge repre-
sentation and reasoning under uncertain and incomplete knowledge, see e.g. [17]. Among the approaches proposed in the
literature, Hájek and colleagues have developed an alternative approach (see e.g. [16]) where uncertainty reasoning is for-
malized as suitable modal theories over suitable [0,1]-valued fuzzy logics. The basic idea of this approach is to consider
the belief degree of a (classical) proposition as the truth-degree of a fuzzy modal proposition. For instance, in the case where belief
degrees are modeled as probabilities, for each classical (two-valued) formula ϕ , they consider a graded modal formula Bϕ
which is interpreted as “ϕ is probable”, whose truth-degree can be set as the probability of ϕ . Moreover, using Łukasiewicz
logic one can express the governing axioms of probability theory as logical axioms involving modal formulae of the kind Bϕ .
In this way, many-valued models of these modal axioms faithfully correspond to probability measures over classical (non-
modal) formulae. This approach can be also applied to other graded mental attitudes, such as desires or intentions, as it
will be done in the next two sections.1
3. Desire context (DC)
The Desire context is in charge of dealing with the agent’s desires. We deﬁne next a many-valued modal logic to repre-
sent and reason about the agent bipolar preferences, i.e. a language, a semantics and a set of axioms. Adopting the semantics
based on guaranteed possibility measures, a precise meaning of desire degrees is given.
As desires are ideal preferences, we consider that it may be somewhat controversial, and domain dependent, to set
(normative) general restrictions about positive (respectively negative) desires both on a formula and its negation, and also
between the positive and negative desires on a given formula. Hence, we will present a basic axiomatics for bipolar desires
representation, and then, we will consider several axiomatic extensions to cope with some meaningful additional constraints.
3.1. DC language
The language LDC is deﬁned over a classical propositional language L (built from a countable set of propositional vari-
ables Var with connectives → and ¬), which is expanded with two (fuzzy) modal operators D+ and D− . D+ϕ reads as
“ϕ is positively desired” and its truth-degree represents the agent’s level of satisfaction would ϕ become true. D−ϕ reads
as “ϕ is negatively desired” (or “ϕ is rejected”) and its truth-degree represents the agent’s level of disgust on ϕ becoming
true. We will use a fuzzy modal logic to formalize graded desires and we select Rational Pavelka logic as the underlying
fuzzy logic (see Appendix A). More precisely, formulae of the expanded language LDC are deﬁned as follows, where Sat(L)
denotes the set of satisﬁable formulae of L:
• If ϕ ∈ L then ϕ ∈ LDC
• If ϕ ∈ Sat(L) then D−ϕ, D+ϕ ∈ LDC2
• If r ∈ Q ∩ [0,1] then r¯ ∈ LDC
• If Φ,Ψ ∈ LDC then Φ →Ł Ψ ∈ LDC and ¬ŁΦ ∈ LDC (other Łukasiewicz logic connectives, like ⊗,⊕,∧Ł,∨Ł,≡Ł are deﬁn-
able from ¬Ł and →Ł)
1 Indeed, for simplicity reasons, we will use in this research note the same underlying fuzzy logic for beliefs, desires and intentions, the so-called Rational
Pavelka logic (RPL), an expansion of Łukasiewicz logic with rational truth-constants [16], which is brieﬂy described in Appendix A.
2 We deﬁne the modal formulae excluding the possibility of having positive and negative desires on a contradiction, ⊥ /∈ Sat(L).
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operator. The notation (D+ψ, r), with r ∈ [0,1] ∩ Q, will be used as a shortcut of r¯ →Ł D+ψ , and reads as: the level of
positive desire of ψ is at least r. Analogously for (D−ψ, r) and r¯ →Ł D−ψ .
In this context, the agent’s preferences will be expressed as a theory TD (a set of D-formulae) containing quantita-
tive expressions about positive and negative preferences, like (D+ϕ,α) or (D−ψ,β), as well as qualitative expressions
like D+ψ →Ł D+ϕ (resp. D−ψ →Ł D−ϕ), expressing that ϕ is at least as preferred (resp. rejected) as ψ . In particular
(D+φi,1) ∈ TD means that the agent has maximum preference in φi and is fully satisﬁed if it is true. While (D+φ j,α) /∈ TD
for any α > 0 means that the agent is indifferent to φ j and the agent does not beneﬁt from φ j becoming true. Analogously,
(D−ψi,1) ∈ TD means that the agent absolutely rejects ψi and thus the states where ψi is true are totally unacceptable. If
(D−ψ j, β) /∈ TD for any β > 0 it simply means that ψ j is not rejected.
3.2. DC semantics
Some people would argue that if we consider desires as a proactive attitude, reasoning about desires on disjunctions of
formulae is not very intuitive. In most cases an agent may have plans to achieve ϕ or ψ individually, or to achieve both
(ϕ ∧ ψ ) but not for achieving one of them, that is ϕ ∨ ψ . But in some cases, expressing desires for disjunctions may lead
to more succinct speciﬁcations. According to the semantics presented in [2], the degree of positive desire for (or level of
satisfaction with) a disjunction of desires ϕ ∨ ψ is taken to be the minimum of the degrees for ϕ and ψ . Intuitively, if an
agent desires ϕ ∨ ψ then it is ready to accept the situation where the less desired goal becomes true, and hence to accept
the minimum satisfaction level produced by one of the two desires. In contrast, the satisfaction degree of reaching both
ϕ and φ can be strictly greater than reaching one of them separately. These are basically the properties of the guaranteed
possibility measures (see e.g. [2]). Analogously for the degrees of negative desire or rejection, that is, the rejection degree
of ϕ ∨ ψ is taken to be the minimum of the degrees of rejection for ϕ and for ψ separately, while nothing prevents the
rejection level of ϕ ∧ψ be greater than both.
The intended DC-models are Kripke structures M = 〈W , e,π+,π−〉 where W and e are deﬁned as usual and π+ and
π− are preference distributions over worlds, which are used to give semantics to positive and negative desires:
• π+ : W → [0,1] is a distribution of positive preferences over the possible worlds. In this context π+(w) < π+(w ′)
means that w ′ is more preferred than w .
• π− : W → [0,1] is a distribution of negative preferences over the possible worlds: π−(w) < π−(w ′) means that w ′ is
more rejected than w .
The truth evaluation for non-modal formulae e : L × W → {0,1} is deﬁned in the usual (classical) way. It is extended to
atomic modal formulae D−ϕ and D+ϕ by:
• e(D+ϕ,w) = inf{π+(w ′) | e(ϕ,w ′) = 1}
• e(D−ϕ,w) = inf{π−(w ′) | e(ϕ,w ′) = 1}
together with the assumption that inf∅ = 1. This is extended to compound modal formulae by means of the usual truth-
functions of Łukasiewicz connectives.3
Notice that the evaluation e(w,Φ) of a modal formula Φ only depends on the formula itself and not on the actual world
w ∈ W where the agent is situated, so we will also write eM(Φ) for e(w,Φ). This is consistent with the intuition that
desires represent ideal preferences, regardless of the actual world and regardless of the cost of moving to a world where
the desire is satisﬁed.
We will write M | Φ when e(Φ,w) = 1 for all w ∈ W . Let MDC be the class of all Kripke structures M =
〈W , e,π+,π−〉. Then, for each subclass of models M ⊆ MDC , given a theory T and a formula Φ , we will write T |M Φ
if M | Φ for each model M ∈ M such that M | Ψ for all Ψ ∈ T .
3.3. DC axioms and rules
To axiomatize the above preference-based semantics we need to combine classical logic axioms for non-modal formulae
with Rational Pavelka logic axioms for modal formulae. Also, additional axioms characterizing the behavior of the modal
operators D+ and D− are needed. The following are the axioms and rules of the DC logic:
Axioms:
(CPC) Axioms of classical logic for non-modal formulae
(RPL) Axioms of Rational Pavelka logic for modal formulae
3 Standard truth functions on [0,1] of primitive Łukasiewicz connectives are as follows: x →L y =min(1,1− x+ y),¬L x = 1− x. Truth functions of main
derived connectives are: x⊗ y =max(0, x+ y − 1), x⊕ y =min(1, x+ y), x∧L y =min(x, y), x∨L y =max(x, y), x ≡L y = 1− |x− y|.
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(DC0−) D−(ϕ ∨ψ) ≡Ł D−ϕ ∧Ł D−ψ
Rules:
(MP1) modus ponens for →
(MP2) modus ponens for →Ł
Introduction of D+ and D− for implications:
(ID+) from ϕ → ψ derive D+ψ →Ł D+ϕ
(ID−) from ϕ → ψ derive D−ψ →Ł D−ϕ .
The formalization we present for D− is somewhat different from the approach presented by Benferhat et al. in [3], where
they use a necessity function, i.e. they consider D−φ as N(¬φ). Nonetheless, their axiomatic approach is equivalent to ours,
since the axiom (DC0−) corresponds to the necessity axiom N(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡ N(ϕ) ∧Ł N(ψ). The introduction rules for D+
and D− state that the degree of desire is monotonically decreasing with respect to logical implication. A straightforward
consequence of these rules is that degrees of desire preserve Boolean logical equivalence, i.e. if ϕ and ψ are classically
equivalent, D+ϕ and D+ψ , as well as D−ϕ and D−ψ , are many-valued equivalent.
The notion of proof, denoted by DC , is deﬁned as usual from the above axioms and inference rules. It is a matter of
routine to check that the axioms are valid in each DC-model and that the inference rules preserve validity in each DC-model,
hence the above axiomatization is sound with respect to the deﬁned semantics. Moreover, the basic DC logic is complete
for ﬁnite theories of closed (modal) formulae.
Theorem 1 (Completeness). Let T be a ﬁnite theory of modal formulae and Φ a modal formula. Then T |MDC Φ iff T DC Φ .
Proof. We basically follow the type of proof of [16, Th. 8.4.9] with some adaptations, for details the reader is referred
to [8]. 
The basic logical schema DC puts almost no constraint on the strengths for the positive and negative desires of a formula
ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ . This is in accordance with considering desires as ideal preferences and hence it may be possible for
an agent to have contradictory desires supported by different arguments.5
Example 1. Recall the scenario described in Section 1. María activates a personal agent, based on our g-BDI agent model, to
get an adequate tourist package that satisﬁes her preferences: she would be rather happy of practicing rafting (r) and very
happy going to a mountain place (m), she would like more to go climbing (c) than to go trekking, and she wouldn’t like to
go farther than 1000 km from Buenos Aires ( f ). The user interface that helps her express these desires ends up generating
a desire theory as follows:
TD =
{(
D+r,0.6
)
,
(
D+m,0.8
)
, D+m →Ł D+c,
(
D− f ,0.7
)}
Once this initial desire theory is generated the tourist advisor personal agent deduces a number of new desires:
TD DC
(
D+(m ∧ r),0.8), TD DC
(
D+(m∨ r),0.6), TD DC
(
D+c,0.8
)
As María would indeed prefer much more to be in a mountain place doing rafting she also expresses the combined desire
with a particularly high value: (D+(m∧ r),0.95). Notice that the extended theory T ′D remains consistent within DC:
T ′D = TD ∪
{(
D+(m ∧ r),0.95)}
Notice that if we consider a compound goal such as going to a far mountain place, represented by the conjunction (m∧ f ),
using the DC axioms, the theory TD proves the following lower bounds for the positive and negative desire degrees of
m∧ f :
(
D+(m ∧ f ),0.8), (D−(m∧ f ),0.7)
So, m ∧ f has both a high positive and negative desire degrees. This has not to be seen as a shortcoming of the model, it
actually reﬂects that the compound goal has one subgoal which is highly preferred but also another subgoal which is highly
rejected.
4 Notice that ∧Ł is interpreted by the minimum, namely e(Φ ∧Ł Ψ,w) =min(e(Φ,w), e(Ψ,w)).
5 The only indirect constraint DC imposes is the following one: if a theory T derives (D+ϕ, r) and (D+¬ϕ, s) then, due to axiom (DC0+) and rule (ID+),
T also derives both (D+ψ,min(r, s)) for any ψ .
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The basic schema for preference representation and reasoning provided by the DC logic may be felt too general for some
classes of problems and we may want to restrict the possible assignments of degrees to positive and negative desires for
a formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ . For instance, as positive desires are proactive attitudes, it may not be eﬃcient to assign
non-zero degrees to D+ϕ and to D+¬ϕ , since the agent will be searching for necessarily conﬂicting plans, some aiming to
satisfy ϕ and some to satisfy ¬ϕ .
We propose three different extensions, or schemes, that impose upon the basic logic three different consistency con-
straints between positive and negative desires, both at semantic and syntactic levels. The completeness proofs for the
different extensions proposed run like Theorem 1 with the necessary modiﬁcations. These different schemes underpin dif-
ferent types of agents, as the constraints limit in different ways what formulae the agent will accept as desires.
3.4.1. DC1 schema
It may be unnatural in some domains to simultaneously have positive (in the sense of > 0) desire degrees for D+ϕ
and D+¬ϕ . This constraint and its dual for negative desires amount to require the following additional properties of the
truth-evaluations in the intended models:
• min(e(D+ϕ,w), e(D+¬ϕ,w)) = 0, and min(e(D−ϕ,w), e(D−¬ϕ,w)) = 0
At the level of Kripke structures, this corresponds to require some extra conditions over π+ and π− , namely:
• infw∈W π+(w) = 0, and infw∈W π−(w) = 0
At the syntactic level these conditions are equivalent to add to the basic axiomatic for DC the following two axioms:
(DC1+) D+ϕ ∧Ł D+(¬ϕ) →Ł 0¯ (or equivalently ¬ŁD+())
(DC1−) D−ϕ ∧Ł D−(¬ϕ) →Ł 0¯ (or equivalently ¬ŁD−())
Indeed, one can prove completeness with respect to MDC1 for deductions from ﬁnite theories over the schematic extension
of the DC logic with the above two axioms.
We would like to point out that under this schema one can consistently assign positive (and negative) desires degrees
to compound goals starting from the degrees for the atomic ones (e.g. literals). Indeed, assume we have n atomic goals
p1, . . . , pn , and consider a theory T = {D+li ≡ αi}, where li is pi or ¬pi , representing an assignment of positive desire
degrees to literals under the above schema DC1, that is, if D+li ≡ αi ∈ T , with αi > 0, then D+¬li ≡ 0 ∈ T . It is easy to show
that this theory is consistent with assigning to conjunctions of different literals l1 ∧ · · · ∧ l j the compound degree
α1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ α j
where e.g. ⊕ is the associative operation x⊕ y = x+ y − x · y. In this way one can consistently assign desire degrees to any
compound goal.
3.4.2. DC2 schema
The above logical schema DC1 does not put any restriction on positive and negative desires for the same goal (any clas-
sically satisﬁable formula). According to Benferhat et al. in [3], a coherence condition between positive and negative desires
should be considered, namely, an agent cannot desire to be in a world more than the level at which it is tolerated (not
rejected). This condition, translated to our framework, amounts to require in the Kripke structures the following constraint
between the preference distributions π+ and π−:
• ∀w ∈ W , π+(w) 1−π−(w)
To formulate the axiomatic counterpart that faithfully accounts for the above condition, we consider MDC2 the subclass
of DC–Kripke structures M = (W , e,π+,π−) satisfying the above constraint between π+ and π− . Note that π+(w) 
1−π−(w) iff π+(w)⊗π−(w) = 0.6
To capture at the syntactical level this class of structures, we consider the extension DC2 of the DC system with the
following axiom7:
(DC2) (D+ϕ ⊗ D−ϕ) →Ł 0¯
6 Here we use the same symbol as the Łukasiewicz connective ⊗ to denote its corresponding truth-function on [0,1], i.e. x ⊗ y = max(x+ y − 1,0) for
any x, y ∈ [0,1].
7 An equivalent presentation of axiom (DC2) is D+ϕ →Ł ¬ŁD−ϕ .
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DC-structures.
3.4.3. DC3 schema
A stronger consistency condition between positive and negative preferences was considered in [6], requiring that if a
world is rejected to some extent, it cannot be positively desired at all. And conversely, if a goal is somewhat desired it
cannot be rejected. Indeed, at the semantic level, this amounts to require the intended DC-models M = (W , e,π+,π−) to
satisfy the following condition for any w ∈ W :
• π−(w) > 0 implies π+(w) = 0 (or equivalently, min(π+(w),π−(w)) = 0)
This is a stronger condition than the one presented in the DC2 schema. We will denote by MDC3 the subclass of DC–
Kripke structures satisfying it. At the syntactic level, the axiom that faithfully represents this consistency condition is the
following one:
(DC3) (D+ϕ ∧Ł D−ϕ) →Ł 0¯
Again, the extension of DC logic with the (DC3) axiom can be proven to be complete for ﬁnite theories with respect to
the subclass MDC3 of DC-structures.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). María, a few days later, breaks her ankle. She activates the recommender agent to reject
the possibility of going climbing (c). If María selects for the agent the schema DC1, the agent simply adds the formula
(D−c,1) into the former desire theory T ′D , yielding the new theory:
T ′′D =
{(
D+m,0.8
)
,
(
D+r,0.6
)
,
(
D+(m∧ r),0.95), (D+c,0.85), (D− f ,0.7), (D−c,1)}
as the schema allows for opposite desires.
If María selects DC2, the formulae D+c and D−c are not allowed to have degrees adding up to more than 1, and hence
the above theory T ′′D becomes inconsistent. Actually, T ′′D becomes also inconsistent under DC3, DC3 is stronger than DC2
(it does not even allow to have non-zero degrees for D+c and D−c). In these cases, the agent should apply a revision
mechanism, for instance to remove (D+c,0.85) from the theory.
4. Intention context (IC)
This context represents the agent intentions. We follow the model introduced by Rao and Georgeff [23], in which an
intention is considered a fundamental pro-attitude with an explicit representation. However, as in the work of Cohen and
Levesque [11], in our approach, intentions result from the agent’s beliefs and desires and then, we do not consider them as
a basic attitude. Intentions, as well as desires, represent a sort of the agent preferences. We consider that intentions cannot
depend just on the beneﬁt, or satisfaction, of reaching a (positive) desire ϕ—represented in D+ϕ , but also on the world’s
state w and the cost of transforming it into a world w ′ where the formula ϕ is true. By allowing degrees in intentions we
represent a measure of the cost/beneﬁt relation involved in the agent’s actions towards the desired goal. The formalization
of the intention semantics alone is diﬃcult, because generally it will not only depend on the formula intended, but also on
the plan that the agent executes to achieve a state where the formula is valid. Therefore, as it will be shown below, we have
chosen to a very general framework to axiomatize intentions, able to be specialized to more particular semantics if needed.
We represent in this context two kinds of graded intentions, intention of a formula ϕ considering the execution of a
particularly plan α, noted Iαϕ , and the ﬁnal intention to ϕ , noted Iϕ , which takes into account the best path to reach ϕ . As
in the other contexts, if the degree of Iϕ is δ, it may be considered that the truth-degree of the expression “ϕ is intended”
is δ. The intention to make ϕ true must be the consequence of ﬁnding a feasible plan α, that permits to achieve a state of
the world where ϕ holds.
The language LIC to represent the agent intentions is deﬁned in a similar way as we did in DC, starting with the same
basic propositional language L and incorporating a family of many-valued modal operators. We assume the agent has a
ﬁnite set of actions or plans Π f (a ﬁnite subset of the potentially inﬁnite set of actions Π ) at her disposal to achieve the
desires. Then, for each α ∈ Π f we introduce a modal operator Iα such that the truth-degree of a formula Iαϕ will represent
the strength the agent intends ϕ by means of the execution of the particular action α.8 We also introduce another modal
operator I with the idea that the truth-degree Iϕ will represent the intention degree with which the agent intends ϕ by
means of the best plan in Π f .
Models for IC are Kripke structures M = 〈W , e, {να}α∈Π f 〉 where, as in the DC-structures, W is a set of worlds and
e : W × Var → {0,1} is such that, for each world w ∈ W , e(w, ·) is a Boolean evaluation of propositional variables, which is
8 In the IC we are not concerned about the question of whether a given desire can be reached by the execution of a particular action, this is left for the
Planner context, see Section 6.
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that the sets {w ∈ W | e(w,ϕ) = 1} are ν-measurable for each proposition ϕ) which provides a measure of the degree of
intention for (the set of models of) a goal by means of the plan α. Intuitively, without any other information about how
much the goal is desired, how costly is the application of α or how probable is that the goal will become true by executing
α, the only property which is required to να is that a disjunction of goals has to be intended at least to the degree of the
least intended goal, i.e. for each A, B ∈ U :
min
(
να(A), να(B)
)
 να(A ∪ B)
Actually, this is a very general condition, which is compatible with different particular semantics an agent may consider.
Indeed, as one would expect, this is a weaker condition than the one required for desires since in case degrees of intentions
become independent of the cost of the actions (because e.g. all actions have the same cost), their properties should be
basically the same as those of desires. This condition is compatible as well with the semantics of intention degrees used
in step 5 of Section 6 as a form of expected global beneﬁt, where beneﬁt is understood as the utility of reaching a goal
(as a function of its desire degree) minus the cost of the action used to reach that goal.9 Indeed, let us denote by [ϕ]
the set of worlds where ϕ is true, Pα([ϕ]) the probability of making ϕ true after α, D([ϕ]) the positive desire degree
of ϕ , u : [0,1] → R a non-increasing mapping transforming desire degrees into negative costs, cα the (real-valued) cost
of the action α, and h : R→ [0,1] a non-decreasing map interpreting beneﬁts into normalized utility degrees, and deﬁne
να([ϕ]) = h(Pα([ϕ]) ·(u(D([ϕ]))−cα)). Then one can indeed check that the inequality να([ϕ]∪[ψ])min(να([ϕ]), να([ψ]))
holds.
Finally, let us mention that the above condition on να says nothing about whether the intention degree is monotonically
increasing or decreasing with respect to inclusion (implication). In fact, if a goal ϕ has a relatively high intention degree,
then the joint intention degree of ϕ with another goal ψ , i.e. the degree of the conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ , can be higher when ψ
is also highly desired, but can also be lower if ψ is rejected.
Then, an evaluation e in each world is extended to atomic modal formulae by stipulating
• e(w, Iαϕ) = να({w ∈ W | e(w,ϕ) = 1})
• e(w, Iϕ) =max{e(w, Iαϕ) | α ∈ Π f }
and to compound modal formulae using the truth functions of Rational Pavelka logic.
As usual, we will write M | Φ when e(Φ,w) = 1 for all w ∈ W and will denote by MIC the class of all Kripke structures
M = 〈W , e, {να}α∈Π f 〉. Then, given a theory T and a formula Φ , we will write T |MIC Φ if M | Φ for each model
M ∈ MIC such that M | Ψ for all Ψ ∈ T .
A complete axiomatics for the IC logic with respect to the class of structures MIC is the following:
1. Axioms of classical logic for the non-modal formulae
2. Axioms of Rational Pavelka logic for the modal formulae
3. Axiom for Iα modalities: (Iαϕ ∧Ł Iαψ) →Ł Iα(ϕ ∨ψ)
4. Deﬁnitional axiom for I: Iϕ ≡Ł ∨α∈Π f Iαϕ
5. Inference rules: modus ponens for → and for →Ł , and introduction of Iα for equivalences: from ϕ ≡ ψ derive Iαψ ≡Ł
Iαϕ for each α ∈ Π f .
The axiom for the Iα is indeed weaker than the (DC0+) and (DC0−) axioms for desires, while axiom 4 syntactically
captures the idea that the intention degree of ϕ is the highest degree with which the agent intends ϕ by means of some
plan in Π f . The rule of introduction of the Iα operators for equivalences is needed to guarantee the syntactic irrelevance of
these operators, and it is obviously weaker than the rules of introduction of the positive and negative desires for implications
in the DC.
The notion of proof for IC, denoted by IC , is deﬁned as usual from the above axioms and inference rules. The presented
axiomatics is obviously sound and one can prove completeness in an analogous way as for DC logic and hence we omit the
proof.
Theorem 2. Let T be a ﬁnite modal theory and Φ a modal formula. Then T IC Φ iff T |MIC Φ .
5. Belief context (BC)
In this context the agent represents her uncertain beliefs about the world where she lives. Since situated agents need
to reason about their possible actions and the changes they may cause to the environment, the potential consequences
of actions must be part of any situated agent’s beliefs set. We use propositional Dynamic logic (PDL) [19] to describe
9 A similar semantics for intentions is used in [24], where the net value of an intention is deﬁned as the difference between the value of the intention
outcome and the cost of the intention.
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approach to the one used in the other mental contexts. Here, atomic modal formulas of the BC logic are of the form Bϕ ,
where ϕ is a PDL formula. In particular, B[α]ϕ is meant to denote that it is likely, or probable, that after executing action α,
ϕ becomes true. The probabilistic logic for BC is then axiomatized as a theory in Rational Pavelka logic (RPL), again in a
similar way than as we do in the DC and IC contexts. Due to space limitations, details on the language deﬁnition, axioms
and rules for the BC context are not included here but can be checked in [6]. We would like to note that other uncertainty
models (like the possibilistic necessity model) might be used as well.
6. Functional contexts and Bridge rules
In this section we present the remaining necessary components of our multi-context agent architecture example: the
Planner context (PC), the Communication context (CC) and the Bridge rules (BR). The Planner context (PC) builds plans to
satisfy the user’s desires, where plans have an associated cost according to the actions involved. The theory of planning in
PC includes special predicates to represent actions, plans, beliefs and desires, such as the predicate fplan:
• fplan(ϕ , α, preC, postC, cα ) is generated within PC when a plan instance is found to be feasible, that is, if and only if:
(i) α makes ϕ true, (ii) ϕ is such that (D+ϕ,d0) belongs to the DC theory of the agent over a given threshold d0, (iii)
the preconditions hold to some degree, i.e. (BpreC, s0) must be in the BC theory for a given threshold s0, and (iv) avoids
negative desires as post-conditions, i.e. if (¬ŁD−postC,1 − e0) belongs to the agent DC theory then e0 must be very
small. cα ∈R is the cost of the plan.
The Communication context (CC) makes it possible to encapsulate the agent’s internal structure by having a unique and
well-deﬁned interface with the environment. The theory inside this context will take care of the sending and receiving
of messages to and from other agents in the multiagent society where our g-BDI agents live. The Communication context
perceives changes in the environment and adds them as beliefs into the Belief context BC via a bridge rule (see step 1
below). Also, it declares the preferred actions to execute via another bridge rule (see step 7 below).
For our running illustrative example of g-BDI agent architecture (see Fig. 1), we deﬁne a set of basic bridge rules and we
show the information ﬂow from perception to action.
1. CC perceives the environment: The agent perceives the environment and generates graded beliefs (where the degree r
depends on the perception) by means of the following Bridge rule:
CC : ϕ
BC : (Bϕ, r)
2. DC gets the user’s graded positive and negative desires: The agent receives the user preferences as formulae in the DC
context in a similar way: from user’s expressed desires, and using a bridge rule, to graded positive and negative desires.
3. Desires and beliefs are passed from DC and BC to PC: From positive and negative desires, and beliefs about plans and domain
knowledge, bridge rules generate corresponding predicate instances (quoting using .)10 in the PC context:
DC : (D+ϕ,d)
PC : posdesire((D+ϕ,d))
DC : (D−ψ,d)
PC : negdesire((D−ψ,d))
BC : (BΦ, r)
PC : belief ((BΦ, r))
4. PC looks for feasible plans, as mentioned above, feasible plans fulﬁll (to some degree) positive desires, satisfy some pre-
conditions and avoid undesired postconditions. Thus, PC generates predicate instances of fplan(ϕ , α, preC, postC, cα).
5. A process for deriving intentions: Here we assume actions (and plans) do not fail11 and that a belief degree r in a formula
(B[α]ϕ, r) is interpreted as the probability that ϕ satisﬁes the user by executing α. Then, the intention degree to reach
a desire ϕ by means of a plan α is taken as a trade-off between the beneﬁt of reaching this desire and the cost of the
plan, weighted by the belief degree r. This is implemented by the following bridge rule:
DC : (D+ϕ,d),BC : (B[α]ϕ, r),PC : fplan(ϕ,α,preC,postC, cα)
IC : (Iαϕ,h(r · (u(d)− cα))) (1)
where u : [0,1] →R is a non-decreasing mapping that transforms desire degrees into negative costs (beneﬁts), i.e. u(d)
can be interpreted as how much the user accepts to pay to achieve a goal desired to the degree d, and h : R→ [0,1]
is a non-decreasing transformation that maps global beneﬁts back to normalized utility degrees. Indeed, the value
h(r · (u(d)− cα)) can be read as a monotone transformation of the expected beneﬁt of intending ϕ through plan α.
6. Action selection process: The information supplied by the above bridge rule to the IC context allows this context to derive
(Iϕ, iϕ), a single intention formula for each desire ϕ . That is, iϕ is the intention degree of the best feasible plan for ϕ
(see the deﬁnitional axiom for I in Section 4).
10 A quoting mechanism such as . allows to transform modal formulae into ﬁrst order logic terms.
11 Otherwise, we would need to consider richer stochastic processes like MDPs or POMDPs.
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PC : fplan(ϕ,α,preC,postC, cα), IC : (Iαϕ, iϕ), IC : (Iϕ, iϕ)
CC : do(α, iϕ)
The agent interacts with the environment through the Communication context CC by declaring which plan α the agent
will ﬁnally execute. To do so, the CC selects the action with the highest degree among the formulae do(α, iϕ) received
via the previous bridge rule.
7. Discussion and related work
In this research note we have reported on the development of a graded intentional agent scheme for practical reasoning,
deﬁned as a multi-context system, where logical contexts provide a formal representation (complete axiomatizations) of the
different mental attitudes (belief, desires and intentions) and an interaction framework for them.
The preliminary idea of extending BDI architectures with graded mental attitudes goes back to Parsons and Giorgini [20],
where, also within a multi-context system approach, they introduce graded beliefs by means of mass assignments in the
sense of the Dempster–Shafer theory. This multi-context model of BDI agents in a bi-valued approach has been previously
proposed in [21]. Blee et al. [4] also introduce grades in all the mental notions of BDI. They use a common syntax for the
agent’s mental attitudes while in our multi-context system approach we deﬁne in a separate way a suitable logic for each
attitude.
The problem of preference representation has been tackled in the literature with quite a different number of approaches.
Inspired in [2,3], a possibilistic bipolar representation of preferences has been used in our agent model. This is related but
somewhat different from the logic deﬁned by Lang et al. in [18] to represent (conditional) desires with a semantics based on
utility losses and gains. These utilities are added up to a single measure which, together with domain knowledge, induces
a (qualitative) partial preference ordering over worlds. In contrast with Boutilier [5] they also differentiate between factual
background knowledge, that tells which worlds are physically impossible, and contingent knowledge, expressing which of
the physical possible worlds can be the actual state of affairs. Then, the agent should aim at the best feasible world by
performing a suitable action but their work is not focused on action theories. We ﬁnd some differences with respect to
our agent mode. First, it does not include an explicit representation of the agent rejections (negative preferences); second
desires are only qualitatively represented (preference order over worlds) while in our model can also represent the strength
of them in a numerical way.
An argumentation approach to practical reasoning is proposed in [22,1] where they provide a rich argumentation-based
framework for uncertain beliefs, consistent desires, and for generating consistent plans for achieving these desires. These
plans, called intentions, are generated via some ad-hoc rules, that could be mapped into particular bridge rules in our
approach. In contrast to our approach, the authors do not present a, strictly speaking, formal system (a sound and complete
logical system) to represent and reason with these graded attitudes according to a suitable uncertainty model.
Finally, in [12,13] the authors also propose a very similar possibilistic approach to deal with graded beliefs and desires,
that are used afterwards to determine the agent’s goals. A set of desire generation rules (similar to the ones in [22])
determine the graded positive desires and they refer to the representation of negative desires we use in our model as future
work. In particular, in [13] they propose different belief change operators to deal with trust and distrust. Belief change may
induce changes in the justiﬁcation degrees of some desires/goals. Then, in [12] they explore the belief-goal consistency and
incompleteness in the proposed formalism for BDI agents. These relations and the ones called realisms [21], as well as the
desire generation rules, can also be modeled in the g-BDI agent architecture by deﬁning appropriate bridge rules.
It is clearly a matter for further research to include in our logical framework a revision process for beliefs, desires and
intentions in order to keep these attitudes consistent for agents living in dynamic environments.
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Appendix A. About Rational Pavelka logic
Rational Pavelka logic RPL is an extension of Łukasiewicz’s inﬁnitely-valued logic by expanding its language with rational
truth-constants to explicitly reason about degrees of truth. It was introduced by Pavelka in the late seventies and Hájek
provided in [16] a simpler formalization.
Formulae are built from propositional variables p1, p2, . . . and truth constants r¯ for each rational r ∈ [0,1] using two
connectives, an implication →Ł and a negation ¬Ł . Other connectives can deﬁned from these ones, in particular two con-
junctions, two disjunctions and an equivalence:
ϕ ⊗ψ stands for ¬Ł(ϕ →Ł ¬Łψ) ϕ ⊕ψ stands for ¬Łϕ →Ł ψ
ϕ ∨Ł ψ stands for (ϕ →Ł ψ) →Ł ψ ϕ ∧Ł ψ stands for ¬Ł(¬Łϕ ∨Ł ¬Łψ)
ϕ ≡ ψ stands for (ϕ → ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ)Ł Ł Ł Ł
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x →Ł y =min(1,1− x+ y) ¬Łx = 1− x
Taking them into account, the corresponding truth functions for the above deﬁnable connectives are:
x⊗ y =max(0, x+ y − 1) x⊕ y =min(x+ y,1)
x∨Ł y =max(x, y) x∧Ł y =min(x, y)
x ≡Ł y = 1− |x− y|
An RPL evaluation e is a mapping of propositional variables into [0,1]. Such a mapping uniquely extends to an evaluation
of all formulae using the above truth functions and deﬁning e(r¯) = r for each rational r ∈ [0,1]. Note that e(r¯ →Ł ϕ) = 1 iff
r  e(ϕ). An evaluation is a model of a set of formulae (theory) T whenever e(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ T . A formula ψ is a logical
consequence of a theory T , written T |RPL ψ , whenever e(ψ) = 1 for every evaluation e that is a model of T .
Logical axioms of RPL are:
(i) axioms of Łukasiewicz’s logic
ϕ →Ł (ψ →Ł ϕ) (ϕ →Ł ψ) →Ł
(
(ψ →Ł χ) →Ł (ϕ →Ł χ)
)
(¬Łϕ →Ł ¬Łψ) →Ł (ψ →Ł ϕ)
(
(ϕ →Ł ψ) →Ł ψ
)→Ł
(
(ψ →Ł ϕ) →Ł ϕ
)
(ii) bookkeeping axioms (for arbitrary rationals r, s ∈ [0,1]):
¬Łr¯ ≡Ł 1− r r¯ →Ł s¯ ≡Ł min(1,1− r + s)
The only deduction rule is modus ponens for →Ł . The notion of proof in RPL, denoted by RPL , is deﬁned as usual from the
above axioms and rule. RPL has been shown to be complete for deductions from ﬁnite theories: for each ﬁnite T and ϕ ,
T RPL ϕ iff T |RPL ϕ .
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